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KANT ON ART AND TRUTH AFTER PLATO 
TOM ROCKMORE

 
Kant’s theory of aesthetics provides an interesting view of the 
perennial Western aesthetic problem of the relation of art and truth. This 
problem dates back in the Western tradition at least to Plato, who, on 
epistemological grounds, infamously banishes art from the city-state. 
According to Plato, art must but cannot grasp the truth, which can only be 
grasped by the philosopher who can literally “see” the real. On this basis, 
he says we should banish the artist, who is incapable of cognizing the real 
from the city-state. In different ways, Plato’s denial that art, or, if there is a 
difference, at least ordinary, non-philosophical art, can successfully 
imitate the real runs throughout the entire aesthetic tradition.  
Frederick Beiser recently raised anew the question of the relation 
between art and truth. Beiser attacks Kant for supposedly holding an 
incoherent, anti-rationalist view of aesthetic truth. Specifically, Beiser 
denies aesthetic judgements, holding up Gadamaer as a counterexample.
1
 
According to Beiser, aesthetic judgments about the characteristics of an 
object must be true or false, but Kant bases his view on feeling which is 
subjective. 
Beiser believes Kant does not support but rather attacks cognitive 
judgment in the third Critique. Beiser has in mind a cognitive approach to 
aesthetic judgment that, hence, can be either true or false, in his view with 
respect to the so-called intentional state understood as a feature or features 
of the object itself.
2
 Aesthetic rationalism and aesthetic anti-rationalism 
 
 
  Distinguished Professor, McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts, Duquesne 
University. Author of several recent works on Kant, Plato, and aesthetics, including ART AND TRUTH 
AFTER PLATO (2013), KANT AND PHENOMENOLOGY (2010), and KANT AND IDEALISM (2007). 
 1. See FREDERICK C. BEISER, DIOTIMA’S CHILDREN: GERMAN AESTHETIC RATIONALISM FROM 
LEIBNIZ TO LESSING (2009). 
 2. See id. at 5. Beiser states: 
All these tenets come together in the rationalist’s thesis that aesthetic judgment is cognitive, 
i.e., that it can be true or false. The rationalist insists that the pleasure of aesthetic experience 
consists in some intentional state, i.e., it refers to some features of the object itself. This 
means that there must be some reason for an aesthetic judgment, some evidence which makes 
it true or false. The judgment is true or false according to whether the object has or does not 
have the intended features, viz., its harmony or unity in variety. The competing empiricist 
theory of aesthetic judgment states that aesthetic judgment is non-cognitive, i.e., that the 
pleasure involved in aesthetic judgment is not intentional but only consists in feeling or 
sensation. For the rationalists, the great strength of their cognitive theory is that it satisfies the 
principle of sufficient reason, whereas the great weakness of the empiricist theory is that it 
violates this principle. The rationalists complain that, on empiricist premises, no reason other 
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share the view that pleasure is central to aesthetic experience. Unlike the 
empiricist, the rationalist further insists that pleasure is linked to cognition, 
or even a cognitive state.
3
 Kant, on the contrary, rejects the rationalist 
approach to aesthetics and puts forward two arguments. First, we cannot 
prove that a work of art is beautiful since the ultimate test is pleasure.
4
 
Second, we do not judge works of art according to concepts but according 
to the so-called “free play” between imagination and the understanding.5 
The central point lies not in the suggestion that aesthetic judgment 
must be true or false, but that Kant turns away from aesthetic cognition. 
Beiser seems to have in mind a rejection of the Copernican revolution as a 
condition of an acceptable aesthetic theory. He advocates, perhaps on 
grounds of metaphysical realism, that it is possible to grasp and 
cognitively evaluate the intrinsic characteristics of the object in itself, 
contending that it is as it is beyond mere appearance. 
Yet, by clearly distinguishing between phenomena and noumena, Kant 
denies that we can know a mind-independent object initself. He, hence, 
departs from a view of aesthetics based on claims that are true or false 
about the characteristics of the object. That does not, however, entail that 
he rejects aesthetic rationalism, or more precisely, a claim for the link 
between art and truth. Hence it does not follow that Kant is guilty, as 
Beiser puts it, of a so-called “disastrous subjectivization of aesthetic 
experience.”6 
Beiser’s objection goes beyond Kant to cover what the latter takes over 
from Baumgarten (never mentioned in the third Critique). It is widely 
known that the latter revises the meaning of the word “aesthetics,” which 
meant “sensation,” to mean “taste” or “sense of beauty.” Before 
Baumgarten, the word had been used since the time of the ancient Greeks 
to mean the ability to receive stimulation from one or more of the bodily 
senses. In his Metaphysics at section 451, Baumgarten broadly defines 
taste as the ability to judge according to the senses, instead of according to 
the intellect.
7
 
 
 
than feeling could be given for an aesthetic judgment, so that one cannot justify one’s 
preferences over those of someone else. 
Id. 
 3. Id. at 7. 
 4. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT 5:280, at 161, 5:284, at 164, 
5:285, at 166 (Paul Guyer, ed., Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews trans., 2000) [hereinafter KANT, 
JUDGMENT] (Sections 31, 33, and 34). Page references, e.g., 5:280, are to the Akademie edition. The 
second page number, e.g., 161, refers to the corresponding page in the 2000 Guyer edition. 
 5. See id. at 5:213, at 99, 5:231, at 116 (Sections 8 and 17). 
 6. BEISER, supra note 2, at 27. 
 7. ALEXANDRI GOTTLIEB BAUMGARTEN, METAPHYSICA 149–60 (7th ed. 1963) (1779). 
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Such a judgment of taste is based on feelings of pleasure or 
displeasure. For Baumgarten, a science of aesthetics would be a deduction 
of the rules or principles of artistic or natural beauty from individual taste. 
In the first Critique, following Baumgarten, Kant says that the 
Germans employ the word “aesthetics” to refer to the critique of taste.8 
Nine years later, in the third Critique, Kant employs the word “aesthetic” 
to mean the judgment of taste or the estimation of the beautiful. For Kant, 
an aesthetic judgment is subjective in that it relates to the observer’s 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure and not to any qualities of the external 
object. In other words, Kant now abandons the a priori approach to 
subjectivity he favors in the first and second Critiques for an a posteriori 
approach to the aesthetic object. 
According to Kant, we should distinguish between something that is 
agreeable, or agreeable to the subject, which depends on the observer, and 
is subjective, and something that is beautiful, which is presumably 
independent of the particular observer. 
Kant expects that other people will agree with us about the object we 
find beautiful, as though our judgment were objective.
9
 “When we call 
something beautiful, the pleasure that we feel is expected of everyone else 
in the judgment of taste as necessary, just as if it were to be regarded as a 
property of the object that is determined in accordance with 
concepts . . . .”10 Kant appears to draw attention to a deep similarity 
between morality and aesthetics. Since taste is objective and not 
subjective, we can expect it of all observers “as if it were a duty.”11 
Beiser’s obvious objection is that since observers disagree, this ideal is 
not met. This objection is a variation of Descartes’ point that 
commonsense is insufficient to produce agreement; hence, we require a 
method to agree. I take Beiser to be demanding a method that will 
presumably produce agreement among aesthetic observers on objective 
grounds. Yet this is a deep mistake, since our views of beauty, which are 
 
 
 8. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON B35, at 156 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. 
Wood eds. & trans., 1998) [hereinafter KANT, PURE REASON]. Page references, e.g., B35, are to the 
first (A) and second (B) editions, or both where applicable. The second page number, e.g., 156, refers 
to the corresponding page in the 1998 Guyer and Wood edition. 
 9. See ECKART FÖRSTER, THE TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PHILOSOPHY 126 (Brady Bowman 
trans., 2012). 
 10. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT 5:218, at 103 (Paul Guyer ed., 
Paul Guyer & Eric Matthews trans., 1998) (1790) [hereinafter KANT, POWER OF JUDGMENT]. Page 
references, e.g., 5:218, are to a volume and page in the Akademie edition. The second page number, 
e.g., 103, refers to the corresponding page in the 1998 Guyer edition. 
 11. Id. at 5:296, at 176 (citation omitted).  
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not and which cannot be a universal in a Platonic sense, are not 
independent of but rather are dependent on social context.  
This suggests two points, neither of which Kant can accept. What one 
takes to be beautiful is in some ineliminable sense pre-philosophic, that is, 
a function of who one is. Further, the possibility of objective artistic 
interpretation is undermined by the fact that interpretation is infinite. Since 
the aesthetic object cannot be exhausted, there are infinite possible 
interpretations. 
This is exactly the point Hegel brings against Kant’s view of morality. 
The mistake also cannot be rectified merely by taking a utilitarian 
approach in claiming pleasure is intrinsically linked to the interest of 
human beings, thereby bringing the highest good into existence.  
PLATO ON ART AND TRUTH 
The problem is, of course, very old. An early version of the cognitive 
approach to aesthetics occurs in the ancient Greek belief in the unity of the 
true, the good, and the beautiful, which is supposedly exemplified by the 
ideal state. Plato seems to be an aesthetic rationalist. He is apparently 
committed to the view that art must grasp the mind-independent real that 
cannot be known through artistic imitation. Instead, it can be directly 
grasped by some selected individuals on grounds of nature and nurture. In 
our time, Heidegger exemplifies the view that aesthetics captures the 
features of the object. Yet there is no reason, and Beiser provides none, 
why we must restrict aesthetics to claims that are true or false about mind-
independent objects. The deeper problem is how to understand the relation 
of Kantian aesthetics and cognition. 
This problem is interesting for several reasons. To begin with, it 
concerns the proper way to read Kant’s view of aesthetics. It is an 
understatement to say that, after several hundred years of effort, we still do 
not know how to read the critical philosophy. Paradoxically, we must 
resort to interpretation, which is never certain and never apodictic, to grasp 
Kant’s critical philosophy, which itself is supposedly apodictic. The 
difficulty is only heightened since the range of interpretation of Kant’s 
aesthetic views is so large. Thus some readers of Kant, for instance, 
Schelling, believe that the third Critique is Kant’s deepest and most 
profound work,
12
 while others believe it is essentially muddled. 
 
 
 12. See 10 FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH SCHELLING, SÄMMTLICHE WERKE 177 (1856). 
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This difficulty further concerns the relation between two central figures 
in the Western tradition: Kant and Plato. We do not know and cannot now 
recover Plato’s position, if indeed he had one in a recognizably modern 
sense. It is surprisingly not known if Kant ever read Plato, though his 
claim to be a deep Platonist
13
 suggests an important link between his 
position and Plato’s. It is then interesting to determine if Kant follows 
Plato’s effort to delink art and truth by rejecting representation of the real. 
Another component of this problem is the general relation between 
aesthetics and cognition. This relation is understood in different ways by 
philosophers, as well as working artists. For example, Cézanne believes 
there is truth in painting, whereas Picasso claims that art is a lie. Plato, 
who is thinking of contemporary representational art, notoriously denies 
the relation between art and truth. At the same time, he suggests that what 
we can call philosophical art, for instance the ideal city-state described in 
the Republic, is beautiful, good, and also true. Other thinkers advance 
widely different claims. One example is the anti-Platonic view of the 
medieval Christians. They believe that Christian art provides a window 
into divine reality. An anti-Platonic view of Marxists, held by thinkers 
such as Lukács, also exists. Lukács contends that social realism, and hence 
a particular artistic style, goes beyond the distortion because of modern 
industrial society’s role in grasping social truth. 
Kant’s intervention in the debate affects our understanding of the 
relation of art and truth. I will be suggesting that he denies one way of 
understanding this relation, the kind Plato rejects, while pointing toward 
another kind of relation between these terms that Plato apparently does not 
consider. I will further be suggesting that Kant’s “official” conception of 
knowledge in the first Critique follows Plato’s understanding of artistic 
imitation in denying a link between art and truth. It is only through 
redescribing his “widened” view of knowledge in the third Critique that 
art takes shape as a form of knowledge, knowledge of what, in Plato’s 
view, is mere appearance. 
ON KANT’S AESTHETIC RATIONALISM 
Beiser’s claim that Kant favors aesthetic irrationalism is unusual since 
most readers of Kant consider that, as the peak of the Enlightenment, his 
overall position, including his aesthetic view, is almost numbingly 
rationalist. Kant’s theory of aesthetics is formulated in a series of pre-
 
 
 13. See KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 8, at A313-14/B370, at 395–96. 
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critical and critical works, including Observations on the Feeling of the 
Beautiful and the Sublime (1764) and again in the third Critique, which is 
variously known as the Critique of Judgment, the term used here, or again 
more literally as the Critique of the Power of Judgment (Urteilskraft). 
It is not easy to specify the relation between Kant’s conception of 
aesthetics and cognition. Kant’s motivation in preparing the third Critique 
is extremely complex. We may speculate that several disparate concerns 
motivate the composition of this treatise. First, there is the deep difficulty 
concerning the interrelation of pure reason, discussed in the first Critique, 
and practical reason, analyzed in the second Critique and in the 
Groundwork. Kant, who is a highly systematic thinker, needs to overcome 
the obvious disparity between these two forms of reason to realize his 
systematic analysis of reason in general. This difficulty is already apparent 
in the third antinomy that Kant evokes in the first Critique. In the first 
Critique, Kant solves this antinomy by indicating the spheres in which 
natural causality and causality through freedom legitimately function. In 
the third Critique, where Kant returns to the problem of the third 
antinomy, he proposes two widely known solutions to this difficulty. 
These solutions include, first, the subordination of theory to practice, or 
theoretical reason to practical reason, a strategy that points back towards 
Aristotle and later influences Fichte and Marx; and, second, the integration 
of theoretical and practical reason in aesthetic reason, or a third form of 
reason based on aesthetic judgment. 
The unity of reason is a consistent theme in Kant. For instance, in the 
second Critique, he is clear that a critique of (pure) practical reason must 
show the unity of practical and theoretical reason since “there can, in the 
end, be only one and the same reason . . . .”14 Further, there is Kant’s 
possible interest in restating his earlier, pre-critical view of aesthetics, 
worked out in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the 
Sublime (1764) in rigorously critical form. A third possible concern lies in 
restating and enlarging the dimensions of knowledge to include knowledge 
that is not a priori but based on experience through what amounts to a 
logic of the irrational.
15
 Still, a fourth theme is the relation between 
 
 
 14. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 4:391, at 5 (Mary 
Gregor trans., 1997). 
 15. See generally ALFRED BAEUMLER, DAS IRRATIONALITÄTSPROBLEM IN DER ÄESTHETIK UND 
LOGIK DES 18. JAHRHUNDERTS BIS ZUR KRITIK DER URTEILSKRAFT (1975). Baeumler understands 
“irrationality” as the essential lack of logical transparency. “Man nennt diese klare Einsicht in das aller 
logischen Durchsichtigkeit entzogene Wesen der Individualität Irrationalismus.” Id. at 4. In neo-
Kantianism, irrationality points to the limit to which the object can be known. The problem is raised 
earlier, for instance in Fichte’s 1804 version of the Wissenschaftslehre in the so-called projection per 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/4
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aesthetics and teleology. This is the experience of beauty and the 
experience of nature as two sides of aesthetic judgment. 
KANT ON ART AND TRUTH 
The relation between art and truth in Kantian aesthetics has attracted 
increasing attention recently. D.W. Gotshalk, for instance, contends that 
Kant changed his mind in writing the third Critique, since he 
inconsistently holds a formalist theory of natural beauty but an 
expressionist theory of fine art.
16
 Béatrice Longuenesse, presently one of 
Kant’s most ardent defenders, indicates that Kant’s theory is valuable in 
indicating the possibility for all aesthetic subjects to constitute a single 
community of subjects in going beyond their historical and cultural 
limitations.
17
 This “Hegelian” reading of Kant suggests that Kant’s 
aesthetic view cannot be constitutive and is at most regulative. Rudolph 
Makkreel makes a case that reflective judgment is “orientational” in 
enabling the apprehending subject to put things in context while 
 
 
hiatum irrationalem. See J.G. FICHTE, Fifteenth Lecture: FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1804, in THE SCIENCE OF 
KNOWING: J.G. FICHTE’S 1804 LECTURES ON THE WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE 115, 120 (Walter E. Wright 
trans., 2005). This problem dates back at least until Plato, who argues that individual things, or 
appearances, cannot be known. In Lukács's initial Marxism, the same notion refers to the inability of a 
form of philosophy to provide knowledge. Lukács holds that classical German philosophy is 
intrinsically irrational, whereas Marxism is rational. See GEORG LUKACS, HEIDELBERGER ÄSTHETIK 
(1916-1918), reprinted in 17 GEORG LUKACS, WERKE 16 (1974). In German: 
Diese notwendige Geltungsfremdheit des Materials, seine funktionelle “Irrationalität,” wie 
Lask sagt, brauchte das Material mit Erlebnishaftigkeit, mit “Leben” in eine enge Beziehung 
zu bringen, deren Wesen hier in ihren Hauptzügen geklärt werden muß, um durch die 
verschiedenen systematischen Möglichkeiten des Erlebens hindurch zu seiner ästhetischen . . . 
Setzung zu gelangen. 
Id. (citation omitted). For more recent discussion, see Marco Sgarbi, LA LOGICA DELL’IRRAZIONALE. 
STUDIO SUL SIGNIFICATO E SUI PROBLEMI DELLA KRITIK DER URTEILSKRAFT (Mimesis 2010).  
 16. See D.W. Gotshalk, Form and Expression in Kant’s Aesthetics, 7 BRIT. J. AESTHETICS 250, 
260 (1967). Gotshalk states: 
But the view we have set forth has been only that Kant holds a formalist theory of Natural 
Beauty and an expressionist theory of Fine Art. I believe also that these theories can be taken 
in their own terms within their own fields, and that each theory within its field will be found 
to make important contributions to the understanding of Natural Beauty and Fine Art. 
 Our concern in this essay has been with a different question from the overall class 
character and intrinsic merit of Kant's aesthetical theories. To a purely disinterested observer 
there is considerable difference between a formalist and an expressionist aesthetical theory, 
and in Kant's third Critique there is clearly a change from the first type to the second when 
we proceed after some delay (over the Sublime) from his theory of Natural Beauty to his 
theory of Fine Art. 
Id. 
 17. See Béatrice Longuenesse, Kant’s Leading Thread in the Analytic of the Beautiful, in 
AESTHETICS AND COGNITION IN KANT’S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 194, 194–219 (Rebecca Kukla ed., 
2006). 
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discerning one’s own place in the world.18 In that case, aesthetic 
interpretation yields knowledge, though not in Kant’s strict sense of the 
term. Others are more critical. Kant’s view of aesthetic pleasure as merely 
self-referential has been attacked by Rachel Zuckert as “empty”19 and 
failing to account for aesthetic experience. Still others go beyond Kant in 
reformulating a Kantian aesthetic, which supposedly yields a relation 
between art and truth or, on the contrary, in rejecting the project.
20
 Hans-
Georg Gadamer desires to “absorb aesthetics into hermeneutics.”21 He 
accepts a version of Kant’s claim that art cannot yield conceptual 
knowledge, but complains, from a Heideggerian perspective, that Kant 
does not acknowledge the sense in which through interpretation things 
show themselves to us,
22
 precisely the perspective Beiser appears to favor. 
At stake is what knowledge, if any, aesthetics has at its disposal. I take 
Plato to suggest that there is true representation, or again true imitation 
based on intuitive knowledge of the forms, and false representation as in 
non-philosophical imitative art. Kant, who is still often understood as a 
cognitive representationalist,
23
 unlike Plato denies intellectual intuition of 
the real, hence denies knowledge of things in themselves, and further 
denies representation in turning, through the Copernican revolution, to 
cognitive constructivism. Kant formulates a theory of aesthetics that does 
not yield knowledge as Plato apparently understands it in supposedly 
intuitively grasping the forms, nor knowledge as Kant understands in the 
first Critique in bringing sensation under the categories. Though the theory 
of aesthetics does not yield knowledge as earlier understood, it arguably 
yields another kind of knowledge based on mere interpretation. 
 
 
 18. See Rudolf Makkreel, Reflection, Reflective Judgment, and Aesthetic Exemplarity, in 
AESTHETICS AND COGNITION IN KANT’S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 17, at 223, 223–44. 
 19. “[T]hough they are textually grounded, they render Kant’s account unsatisfactory as a 
description of aesthetic experience: [they hold, in effect, that] aesthetic judgment and pleasure are 
purely self-referential (about themselves/each other/their own universal communicability) and thus 
peculiarly empty. It is difficult to see why we should believe that this is what we’re experiencing, 
claiming, or feeling in aesthetic experience.” RACHEL ZUCKERT, KANT ON BEAUTY AND BIOLOGY: AN 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 189 n.14 (2007). 
 20. See generally PAUL CROWTHER, THE KANTIAN AESTHETIC: FROM KNOWLEDGE TO THE 
AVANT-GARDE (2010). 
 21. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 146 (Garrett Barden & John Cumming 
eds. & trans., 1975) (translation revised). 
 22. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, THE RELEVANCE OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND OTHER ESSAYS 
(Robert Bernasconi ed., Nicholas Walker trans., 1986). 
 23. For recent discussion of Kant’s view of representation see BÉATRICE LONGUENESSE, KANT 
AND THE CAPACITY TO JUDGE: SENSIBILITY AND DISCURSIVITY IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC 
OF THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 18–26 (Charles T. Wolfe trans., 1998). 
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Kant refers to interpretation, or hermeneutics, in passing in the first 
Critique. He famously proposes that, since he thought that the critical 
philosophy was misinterpreted by its initial readers, texts should be 
interpreted not with respect to isolated passages but rather with respect to 
the idea of the whole.
24
 His holistic approach to hermeneutics in the first 
Critique suggests texts can be definitively interpreted in correctly grasping 
the supposedly single correct interpretation. Kant similarly signals that 
interpretation is a kind of knowledge in the third Critique by suggesting 
that a judgment of taste is valid for all observers.  
This very interesting hermeneutical suggestion points to an enlarged, 
more inclusive, but still problematic understanding of cognition in the 
third Critique. In place of the earlier view that knowledge in the full sense 
of the term is necessarily a priori only, Kant now substitutes a view of 
knowledge that includes both a priori and a posteriori elements. The 
realm of knowledge henceforth includes the logic of the rational a priori 
as well as, in effect, a logic of the “irrational,” or a logic of the a posteriori 
that was formerly excluded but is now included in the analysis of taste. It 
further follows that judgment, which only emerges as an independent 
faculty in the third Critique, becomes central in Kant’s revised view of 
experience and knowledge. This points to the later Kantian view, which is 
incompatible with the first Critique, but compatible with the third 
Critique, that judgment, which alone determines good and bad usage of 
the understanding, lies deeper than the understanding.
25
 In other words, 
this appears to extend Kant’s theory of interpretation26 beyond the problem 
of the correct reading of his position or of any other philosophical 
position. This widening of the original view of knowledge advanced in the 
first Critique has been underway for some time. The distinction in the 
Prolegomena between sensation, perception, and experience suggests 
there is a kind of knowledge prior to and larger than bringing perceptions 
under scientific laws by converting them to experience. Kant now brings 
this concern to fruition through formulating a theory of aesthetics based on 
a subjective, non-categorial approach to experience. Theoretical 
knowledge is based on the understanding, but aesthetic taste is based on 
judgment. Kant, who was concerned to base theory in practice, emphasizes 
 
 
 24. See KANT, PURE REASON, supra note 8, at Bxliv, at 123. 
 25. See IMMANUEL KANT, GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 25:175 (Akademie ed., 1962) (“Die 
Urteilskraft hat den grössten Wert. Der schlechte und gute Gebrauch des 9Verstandes beruht auf den 
Urteilskraft.”). 
 26. See RUDOLF MAKKREEL, IMAGINATION AND INTERPRETATION IN KANT: THE 
HERMENEUTICAL IMPORT OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 1 (1995). 
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this point in claiming that judgment is more important because it is 
practical.
27
 
The difficulty in Kantian aesthetics does not lie in widening knowledge 
to include interpretation but rather in his overly optimistic view of 
interpretation. Kant, who acknowledges the need for interpretation, 
apparently understands it on the unyielding model, akin to the Platonic 
forms, in which there is neither change, nor development nor history in 
yielding a result that is always correct and never at any point incorrect. But 
interpretation occurs in a historical sequence according to standards 
formed in a social context in which different observers engage in an 
ongoing struggle about how to understand a text, an art object, and so on. 
In apparently either denying or again in failing to detect the intrinsically 
historical character of interpretation, Kant remains consistent with his 
view of knowledge as unchanging while overlooking the interpretive 
dimension in cognitive claims.  
KANTIAN HERMENEUTICS AND THE LIMITS OF AESTHETIC KNOWLEDGE 
In the third Critique Kant applies the conception of interpretation he 
briefly but brilliantly evokes toward the end of the B preface of the first 
Critique to the problem of aesthetics. At stake is the kind of cognitive 
claim, if any, that emerges from a hermeneutical approach to the beautiful. 
This problem is later raised against Heidegger by his most prominent 
student, Gadamer. Gadamer’s point is that Heidegger unsuccessfully tries 
to evade the historicity of interpretation in claiming to go back behind the 
tradition to recover the problem of the meaning of being as it was 
allegedly originally and authentically raised in early Greek philosophy. In 
short, if interpretation is perspectival, then its result cannot be a-
perspectival. It follows that a representation of the past can be constructed, 
but pace Proust, and despite what Heidegger says about being, the past 
itself can never be recovered as it was. In other words, an interpretation 
remains only an interpretation and the past always remains past. 
Beiser praises the fact that Gadamer returns to Plato.
28
 Yet since 
interpretation cannot substitute for dialectic, Gadamer does not and cannot 
reach aesthetic truth through interpretation. Interpretation does not solve 
 
 
 27. KANT, GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN, supra note 25, at 15:171 (“Urtheilskraft ist wichtiger, weil 
sie praktisch ist.”); see also id. at 25:175. 
 28. See BEISER, supra note 1, at 29 (“It is the great merit of Gadamer’s revival of aesthetic truth 
that he returns to its classical sources in Plato.”). 
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(or resolve) Plato’s objection that the artist, who merely imitates, cannot 
know reality. 
A version of this difficulty occurs in Kant’s view of interpretation. In 
the B preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant is concerned with 
understanding theories, including the critical philosophy, through textual 
interpretation. His strategy lies in a qualified return to the ancient religious 
distinction between the spirit and the letter, or again between the part and 
the whole. Kant thinks that in grasping the idea of the whole we avoid 
reaching a mistaken inference based on taking the part out of context. It 
never occurs to him, as the enormous Kant debate amply demonstrates, 
that there can be more than one idea of the whole, for example more than 
one suggestion of what an author intended, more than one way, say, to 
read Kant’s work. Hegel, as already noted, famously points out that a 
similar problem vitiates the Kantian theory of morality. Since every 
concrete situation can always be approached from an infinite variety of 
perspectives, in practice, a single “universalizable” moral rule can never 
be identified.
29
 
A similar difficulty arises in the aesthetic theory that Kant formulates 
in the third Critique. We can reconstruct Kant’s aesthetic view briefly as 
follows: in determinative judgments we subsume given particulars under 
known universals, but in reflective judgments we seek to find unknown 
universals for given particulars. According to Kant, reflective judgments 
are subjective universal judgments, which apparently means that in 
practice reflective judgments are not tied to any universal concept. Hence 
they are subjective in designating what everyone ought to agree about 
even if they do not actually agree. Further, according to Kant, the aesthetic 
judgment of beauty relies on finality in that it appears to be designed with 
a purpose. The judgment that something is sublime goes beyond the limits 
of comprehension by actually inspiring fear. 
Aesthetic judgment is subjective in several senses: it does not concern 
the properties of the object but rather attempts to infer something 
resembling authorial intent; it relies on human beings to infer from a 
single instance to a general rule in roughly the same way that Mill claims 
inference follows from a single case; and it cannot exclude different 
possible inferences. Beiser would like aesthetic judgments to determine a 
property in the aesthetic object, which, according to Kant, is possible only 
through a causal theory. Yet a causal theory of aesthetics does not 
 
 
 29. See G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 252–62 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977). 
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dispense the observer from the need for interpretation and hence does not 
eliminate the subjective dimension. 
Kant’s difficulty lies in admitting the subjective character of aesthetic 
judgment while suggesting it yields knowledge in a way different from 
relying on concepts. Kant, who is crystal clear that beauty cannot be 
determined through concepts, rather relies on a distinction between ideas 
and ideals, or again between a concept of reason and a representation 
adequate to that idea.
30
 A judgment of taste ascribes universal assent, 
which means that everyone should agree in finding an object beautiful, but 
not that it is actually so, that is, not that the object in fact possesses the 
qualities in question.
31
 The arbiter of this relation is common sense, that is, 
the so-called free play of the cognitive powers.
32
 Yet Kant very clearly 
concedes that a judgment of taste that cannot be proven, nor demonstrated 
neither a posteriori nor a priori, hence cannot be objective.
33
  
Everything depends on what it means to demonstrate. Judgments of 
taste, which are not objective in the sense that they can be demonstrated, 
are arguably objective in a different sense. The great cultural critics 
arguably make “objective” aesthetic judgments in at least two senses: in 
helping us to see what we would not otherwise see, and in suggesting 
interpretations of, as well as about, the value of the work. This is a form of 
judgment that arguably depends on discerning the difference between 
ideas and ideals, between artistic perfection and artistic realization, and 
which is exhibited, as well as measured, through critical acumen. 
ON ART AND TRUTH AFTER KANT 
I come now to my conclusion. I have argued two points. First, I 
suggested that the third Critique presents a revised grasp of experience. In 
the first Critique and in the Prolegomena, this term refers to the cognitive 
stage following perception in which content is brought under universal 
scientific laws on the assumption that all experience can be reduced to 
scientific experience. This view is now revised in the new view of 
experience in the third Critique, which is not conceptual but rather non-
conceptual, and this view hence gives rise to interpretation in place of 
knowledge as it was earlier understood, and which can yield nothing more 
than an explanation of the world. Second, I argued that this leads to a 
 
 
 30. See KANT, POWER OF JUDGMENT, supra note 10, at 5:232, at 117. 
 31. See id. at 5:281–83, at 162–64. 
 32. See id. at 5:237, at 121–22. 
 33. See id. at 5:285–86, at 166–67. 
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different view of knowledge. Though this would not be knowledge on the 
view Kant defended earlier, it not only illustrates his view of the 
interpretation of a philosophical position as specified in the B edition of 
the first Critique but it also illustrates what remains if it turns out that 
science itself, hence scientific knowledge, is situated within experience in 
general and, despite Kant’s insistence on science as a priori, is never able 
to leave interpretation behind. This points to the later Kantian view, which 
is apparently incompatible with the view expounded in the first Critique 
but seemingly compatible with that expounded in the third Critique, that 
judgment, which alone determines good and bad usage of the 
understanding, lies deeper than the understanding.
34
  
The change in the conception of experience in the third Critique results 
in a change in the relation of Kant to Plato. In the third Critique, Kant 
denies the connection of art and truth in one sense in considering cognition 
as it is understood in the Critique of Pure Reason. In the sense in which he 
denies that art represents the real, hence in which he turns away from 
metaphysical realism, Kant is a Platonist. If that is what the relation of art 
and truth amounts to, then one can say that Kant does not contradict but 
rather sustains Plato’s complaint that imitative art cannot grasp reality, 
though Kant does not support the related view that the artist should be 
barred from the city. I further argued that, in appealing to interpretation, 
Kant devises a non-Platonic way to relink art and truth based on 
interpretation, which does not require representation, and in that sense, he 
is not a Platonist. In pointing to the hermeneutic dimension, Kant does not 
redeem the relation of art and truth against Plato. Yet he usefully suggests 
ever so obscurely that art has a role to play as an interpretation of 
experience.  
Kant does not develop this idea, perhaps since he is apparently unable 
to admit that there are levels of knowledge, hence levels of cognitive 
objectivity. At stake is a kind of cultural knowledge that depends on 
argument but not on demonstration in, say, the natural scientific sense, and 
that follows from Kant’s distinction between ideas and ideals.  
I would like to suggest that there is further another way to understand 
the relation between art and truth on the basis of Kant’s Copernican 
insight. Kant, from the perspective of his normative view of knowledge in 
the first Critique, does not see the possibility of knowledge as concerns art 
objects, which Hegel, who takes into account Kant’s Copernican 
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revolution, detects with respect to subjects. The central core of the 
Copernican insight, that we only know what we in some sense “construct,” 
suggests that knowledge requires an identity between subject and object, 
knower and known, subjectivity and objectivity. In this respect, Hegel, for 
instance, is not only a Kantian but he brings out, on the basis of Kant’s 
Copernican insight and hence in exploiting a Kantian conceptual resource 
Kant overlooks, an interesting idea about the relation of art and truth. 
Hegel agrees with Kant and Plato that art cannot know the mind-
independent object, but further points out that, since we “concretize” 
ourselves in what we do, in constructing art objects of all kinds, we gain a 
different kind of knowledge, knowledge about ourselves. To conclude, I 
would like to suggest that we find here a way to redeem Kant’s conviction 
that “Urtheilskraft ist wichtiger, weil sie praktisch ist.”35 
 
 
 35. See id. at 15:171. My translation: “The power of judgment has the greatest value. The good 
and bad use of the understanding rests on the power of judgment.” 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss1/4
